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Academic Freedom and the Obligation to
Earn It
DONALD J. WEIDNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The typical faculty justification for academic freedom is utilitarian,
and suggests a variant of the "trickle-down" economics not otherwise in
fashion on most campuses. If faculty are left to their own curricular, ped-
agogic and scholarly devices, it is suggested, everyone-students, facul-
ty, staff and indeed all of society-will be better off because of the ideas,
energies and freedoms that result. Like many businesses, many faculty
want more subsidy and less regulation. A related notion is that faculty
votes should determine major policy decisions within the university,
including decisions about faculty appointments, retention, discipline and
tenure.
Academic freedom is not defined nearly as much as it is discussed.
Although many assume that academic freedom is based in law, no one is
quite sure what that law is. Finally, the suggestion is rarely made in
polite academic conversation that academic freedom resides, not in indi-
vidual faculty members, but in the central administration.
Interest in academic freedom, and in tenure, which to me is a separate
question, tends to be episodic. The McCarthy era, for example, saw an
outpouring of writing on academic freedom, much of it with an empha-
sis on the need to protect free expression on campus.' Decades later,
books such as Profscam2 both reflected and encouraged a movement to
*Dean and Professor, Florida State University College of Law. This paper was presented in
May of 2003 at a Deans Conference sponsored by the Institute for Academic Leadership in
Howey-In-The-Hills, Florida. It is an expansion and refinement of thoughts initially appearing in
Donald J. Weidner, Thoughts on Academic Freedom: Urofsky and Beyond, 33 U. TOL. L. REV.
257 (2001) (Symposium).
1. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955).
2. CHARLES J. SYKES, PROFSCAM: PROFESSORS AND THE DEMISE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
(1988).
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hold the professoriate more accountable. That movement is very much
alive, although with varying emphasis and intensity around the country.
Increased demands for institutional accountability, and increased
competitiveness among academic institutions combine to put today's
deans under pressure to increase and enforce expectations for faculty.
We are managers of institutions populated by, and most of us have come
up through the ranks of, faculty who believe they should be treated as
something more than "mere" employees. As we attempt to hold faculty
accountable to the interests of the university and of the public, claims
will be made that we are violating academic freedom. If we fail to be
accountable, we will lose the academic freedom we have enjoyed.
A. European Roots and the American Association of University
Professors
All agree that notions of academic freedom in the United States find
roots in European universities. Indeed, the only major disagreement on
this point seems to concern whether European universities protected aca-
demic freedom despite their religious roots or because of them.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, many American professors
were attracted by their understanding of academic freedom in German
universities.' The pathbreaking American expression of academic freedom
was the 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure4
(Declaration) for the newly-founded American Association of University
Professors (AAUP). The 1915 Declaration did not directly define aca-
demic freedom,5 but Arthur 0. Lovejoy, a celebrated philosopher and
founder of the AAUP, offered what became a well-known definition:
3. See RUSSELL KIRK, ACADEMIC FREEDOM: AN ESSAY IN DEFINITION 22-23 (1955):
Just what "academic freedom" meant at the German universities, not many Americans
clearly understood: it was, in fact, almost wholly an internal freedom, the right to
organize the curriculum without the interference of the minister of education; and it had
been developed as a last safeguard against political meddling, in the secularized uni-
versities of the new bureaucratic German Empire. It was a tolerance by the state, rather
than the assertion of a prescriptive right or a moral tradition; but American professors
took up this German concept with more good-will than clarity of apprehension.
4. Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, I BULL. AM. ASS'N U.
PROFESSORS 1 (1915), reprinted in 40 BULL. AM. ASS'N U. PROFESSORS 90 (1954).
5. The Declaration did say that the academic freedom of a teacher has three elements: "free-
dom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within the university or college; and freedom
of extra-mural utterance and action." Id. at 93.
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Academic freedom is the freedom of a teacher or researcher in high-
er institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the problems of
his science and to express his conclusions, whether through publi-
cation or the instruction of students, without interference from polit-
ical or ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of
the institution in which he is employed, unless his methods are
found by qualified bodies of his own profession to be clearly
incompetent or contrary to professional ethics.'
This definition was said to reflect "the classical Lehrfreiheit of the con-
tinental academicians."'
B. The Principle of Neutrality
The faculty who drafted the Declaration thought the university as an
entity should be a nonpartisan community detached from the political
struggles of the outside world. "In their view, while individual professors
could express their opinions freely on controversial subjects, academic
institutions should observe a strict neutrality toward all political, eco-
nomic and social issues."8 The founders of the AAUP considered con-
servative trustees and compliant university presidents as the greatest
threat to academic freedom. The principle of institutional neutrality was
an attempt to prevent administrators from establishing official orthodox-
ies that would inhibit professors or penalize them for expressing unpop-
ular opinions. Professors also were to be protected with peer review and
with tenure.'
C. The Professor as Appointee
The Declaration was adamant that professors should not be consid-
ered employees of the university. It distinguished "proprietary institu-
6. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 384 (1930).
7. Will Herberg, On The Meaning of Academic Freedom, in ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM 1
(Valerie Earle ed., 1971). The idea of academic freedom expanded in scope after 1915. In addi-
tion to protecting the role of individual faculty, academic freedom came to include institutional
autonomy in educational policy. "Specifically, universities insisted with greater success that cur-
ricula, admissions policies, and academic standards should be established by the faculty, rather
than by outside groups, and should be fashioned for the sole purpose of carrying out the educa-
tional aims of the institution." BOK, infra note 8, at 5.
8. DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MODERN
UNIVERSITY 5 (1982).
9. Decades later, post-tenure review came to be denounced as exceedingly dangerous.
October 20031
448 Journal of Law & Education
tions," those that exist to propagate a specific religious or secular view-
point, from "ordinary institutions," those that appeal to the general pub-
lic for moral or financial support. The Declaration stated that trustees of
a proprietary institution are overseeing a private trust for the benefit of
those who control the institution's purse strings. It stated that proprietary
institutions could not be expected to advance truth through vigorous and
unrestricted research, and should not be allowed to hold themselves out
as institutions of academic freedom. By contrast, ordinary institutions
should be viewed as public trusts that cannot be permitted to restrict
teaching or research in the same way as proprietary institutions.
The Declaration stated that the prohibition of "proprietary attitude and
privilege" should elevate the employment relationship between trustee
and professor above that of mere employer and employee. Professors are
"appointees, but not in any proper sense the employees"°of the trustees.
Indeed, "so far as the university teacher's independence of thought and
utterance is concerned-though not in other regards-the relationship of
professor to trustees may be compared to that between judges of the
Federal courts and the Executive who appoints them.""
D. Two Recent Cases With A Decidedly Different View
Two relatively recent cases are of special interest in identifying the
role of faculty within the university. Neither case gives even the most
remote suggestion that a faculty appointment is like an appointment to
the federal bench. The first is Urofsky v. Gilmore,"2 which essentially
says that state university professors have no greater academic freedom
rights under the First Amendment than any other state employees. If
there are constitutionally protected academic freedom rights, says
Urofsky, they belong to the university, not to individual faculty. The sec-
ond is Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 3 which identifies some of those university
rights (and duties) and balances them against the constitutional claims of
an abusive faculty member. Both cases are victories not only for deans
and other university managers, but also for all dedicated and productive
faculty and the students they serve. In the case of state universities, they
also represent victories for the taxpayers who pay the bills.
10. BOK, supra note 8, at 98.
11. Id. at 99.
12. 216 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 U.S. 759 (2001).
13. 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'g and remanding 81 F. Supp. 2d 777 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
[Vol. 32, No. 4
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II. UROFSKY: THE PROFESSOR AS EMPLOYEE
A. Introduction to Urofsky
Urofsky says that faculty are employees of the university who are
hired and assigned to do its work. The plaintiffs in Urofsky were six pro-
fessors employed by various public colleges and universities in Virginia.
They challenged a statute that restricts state employees from accessing
sexually explicit material, on computers owned or leased by the state,
without agency approval.'4 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals heard
the case en banc,'5 and held there was no violation of faculty First
Amendment rights.
The professors made two basic arguments. First, they argued that the
statute violated the First Amendment rights of all state employees.
Second, in the alternative, they argued that the statute violated the aca-
demic freedom of college and university professors.
B. The First Amendment Rights of State Employees
Urofsky concluded that the professors' speech was in their role as
employees and hence within the control of their employer. In short,
because the statute did not affect the speech of professors in their capac-
14. The central provision of the statute provides:
Except to the extent required in conjunction with a bona fide, agency-approved
research project or other agency-approved undertaking, no agency employee shall uti-
lize agency-owned or agency-leased computer equipment to access, download, print or
store any information infrastructure files or services having sexually explicit content.
Such agency approvals shall be given in writing by agency heads, and any such
approvals shall be available to the public under the provisions of the Virginia Freedom
of Information Act.
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2827(B) (Michie 2003).
15. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the professors, Urofsky v.
Gilmore, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va. 1998), concluding that the statute unconstitutionally
infringed on state employees' First Amendment rights. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, Urofsky v. Gilmore, 167 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 1999), and a majority of the
active circuit judges voted to hear the appeal en banc. Unless otherwise indicated, the quotes that
follow are from Judge Wilkins' opinion in the en banc review, Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401
(4th Cir. 2000).
October 2003]
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ity as private citizens speaking on matters of public concern, it did not
infringe on their First Amendment rights as state employees.' 6
The most interesting aspect of this portion of the court's opinion is its
statement that restrictions on public employees' speech
in their capacity as employees are analogous to restrictions on gov-
ernment funded speech . . . . In both situations-public employee
speech and government-funded speech-the government is entitled
to control the content of the speech because it has, in a meaningful
sense, "purchased" the speech at issue through a grant of funding or
payment of a salary. 7
The court at this point relied on Rust v. Sullivan,8 in which the Supreme
Court held that regulations prohibiting abortion counseling in a federal-
ly funded project did not violate the First Amendment rights of clinic
staff. The "funding authority" could permissibly restrict the scope of the
project to exclude abortion counseling. This analogy raises a host of
questions about constitutionally permissible restrictions attached to uni-
versity funding. For example, may a state legislature permissibly
exclude the topic of abortion counseling from a state law school's course
in reproductive technology?
C. The Academic Freedom Issue
The Virginia faculty alternatively argued that, even if the statute was
valid as to state employees in general, it violated the First Amendment
academic freedom rights of professors. As the court saw it, the basic aca-
demic freedom argument of the faculty was "that a university professor
possesses a constitutional right to determine for himself, without the
input of the university (and perhaps even contrary to the university's
desires), the subjects of his research, writing and teaching."'9
16. It is debatable whether the First Amendment scrutiny should have been cut off by the
determination that the restriction affected the employees in their capacity as employees. See gen-
erally Recent Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1414 (2001). In concurring in the judgment, Chief Judge
Wilkinson said that the state's interest in the restriction should be balanced against the burden of
the restriction. He concluded that the statute passed muster under a balancing analysis. Urofsky,
216 F.3d at 434-35 (Wilkinson, concurring).
17. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 408 n.6. In other areas of the law, it is recognized that short-term
contracts are different from long-term contractual relationships.
18. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
19. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 409-10. The professors argued in their brief that "[alcademic free-
dom embraces not only professors but [also] the librarians, research assistants, and other staff
[Vol. 32, No. 4
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The Fourth Circuit emphasized that academic freedom, as conceived
of by the AAUP, was a professional norm, not a legal one. The AAUP
principles 20 have been widely adopted into bylaws, faculty contracts and
collective bargaining agreements.
In view of this history, we do not doubt that, as a matter of profes-
sional practice, university professors in fact possess the type of aca-
demic freedom asserted by Appellees. Indeed, the claim of an aca-
demic institution to status as a "university" may fairly be said to
depend upon the extent to which its faculty members are allowed to
pursue knowledge free of external constraints .... Were it not so,
advances in learning surely would be hindered in a manner harmful
to the university as an institution and to society at large.21
Despite this apparent sympathy for academic freedom, the court
referred to the "audacity" of the claim of special constitutional protec-
tion for faculty. Giving special protection to faculty would be "mani-
festly at odds with a constitutional system premised on equality."22 The
Supreme Court "has never recognized that professors possess a First
Amendment right of academic freedom to determine for themselves the
content of their courses and scholarship, despite opportunities to do
so. ' '23 A concurring opinion expressed similar skepticism about the fac-
ulty claims:
If it is the case that the public university's professors operate inde-
pendently of state supervision and public accountability, then it is a
surprise to me. And I am confident that it would come as a surprise
to the public, who pays the professors' salaries in order that they may
conduct important research for the public and without whose tax
without whom they cannot effectively function." Id. at 410 n.8. At oral argument, the professors
"went so far as to suggest that the [statute] infringes on the academic freedom of any state
employee who engages in 'intellectual work' analogous to the work of a professor." Id. The court
referred to the "virtually limitless" nature of this suggestion. Id.
20. The 1915 principles were later compiled in a 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure promulgated by the AAUP and the Association of American Colleges.
21. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 411.
22. Id. at 412 n.13.
23. Id. at 414. The court did leave open the possibility that a denial of authority to access
material "might raise genuine questions-perhaps even constitutional ones-concerning the extent
of the authority of a university to control the work of its faculty...... Id. at 415 n. 17.
October 20031
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money the professors' research and writing would not be possible.24
The court concluded by saying that any constitutional right to aca-
demic freedom that might be said to exist is the university's, not a right
of individual faculty.5 To the extent the Supreme Court has constitu-
tionalized a right of academic freedom, it "appears to have recognized
only an institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs."26
III. BONNELL: ASSERTING THE INTERESTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY
Bonnell v. Lorenzo27 involved an appeal from an order enjoining a dis-
ciplinary suspension of John Bonnell from a teaching position he had
held at Macomb Community College for more than thirty years. The
defendants were sued individually and in their roles as the College's
President, Vice President for Human Resources and Dean of Arts and
Sciences.
A. The Facts
In a memorandum dated February 19, 1998, entitled "Obscene and
vulgar language in the classroom," William MacQueen, the Vice
President for Human Resources, informed Bonnell that the parent of one
of Bonnell's students had filed a letter of complaint against him based
upon a handout that Bonnell had circulated to the members of his class.
The handout was a review of Bonnell's class prepared in 1991 by one of
his former students. The student handout, as quoted in the memorandum,
stated:
Next, the language that was used during the first four weeks or so of
class, in my opinion, was very inappropriate and distasteful. Never
before have I encountered an English teacher who used the word
24. Id. at 424 (Luttig, concurrance).
25. "[T]o the extent the Constitution recognizes any right of "academic freedom" above and
beyond the First Amendment rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the
University, not in individual professors ...." Id. at 409.
26. Id. at 412.
27. 241 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'g and remanding 81 F. Supp. 2d 777 (E.D. Mich.
1999).
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"fuck" so openly and so frequently in a classroom discussion. In
addition, the use of words such as "pussy" and "cunt" are simply
uncalled for and very offensive to many, including me. I really feel
that language such as this is very degrading to women.28
MacQueen's memo went on to inform Bonnell that, although he did not
know the context in which the words were used, he was "concerned that
[his] use of such language in the classroom will give rise to a claim of
sexual harassment on the theory that this language creates a hostile
learning environment for women."29 Knowledge of his past use of such
language, said the memo, placed the College under a legal duty to inves-
tigate whether Bonnell was creating a hostile learning environment.
Accordingly, a meeting was scheduled with Bonnell. It is interesting
how defensive, even apologetic, MacQueen's memo was. The Vice
President for Human Resources seemed to be saying that he was acting
on Bonnell's vulgarity in class only because he was forced to.
Bonnell defended his use of the language. He said that the terms were
not directed toward particular students and were only used to demonstrate
academic points. Bonnell claimed that he used the terms to "point out the
chauvinistic degrading attitudes in society that depict women as sexual
objects, as compared to certain words to describe male genitalia, which
are not taboo or considered to be deliberately intended to degrade."3
After the investigation, MacQueen issued a warning to Bonnell in a
memorandum dated March 4, 1998, entitled "Obscene and vulgar
speech," which provided in part:
Unless germane to discussion of appropriate course materials and
thus a constitutionally protected act of academic freedom, your utter-
ance in the classroom of such words as "fuck," "cunt," and "pussy"
may serve as a reasonable basis for concluding as a matter of law that
you are fostering a learning environment hostile to women, a form of
sexual harassment. Federal and state law imposes a duty on the
College to prevent the sexual harassment of its students and therefore
requires that the College discipline you if it finds that you have cre-
ated a hostile environment.3'
28. Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 803.
29. Id. at 803.
30. Id. at 803.
31. Id. at 803-04.
October 2003]
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Once again, the College's communication is striking because it sounds
so defensive. It is surprising that the memo stated, with no legal support
that I know of, that there is a constitutional right to academic freedom
that includes the right to use words like "fuck," "cunt," and "pussy" if
their use could be considered "germane" to the course. After again reit-
erating the "principle of academic freedom under the 1st Amendment,"
the memo "warned" Bonnell that "a general use in the classroom of
words like 'fuck,' 'cunt,' and 'pussy' outside a professional exegesis may
compel the conclusion that you are creating a hostile learning environ-
ment requiring disciplinary action. 32
Every dean of any experience can guess what came next.
Approximately eight months later, in November of 1998, another female
student in Bonnell's English class filed a complaint alleging that his
classroom language constituted sexual harassment. The complaint stated
that the comments stemmed from stories that were assigned reading that
"revealed sexual innuendos and implications." Rather than discuss them
in a mature way, the student complained, he "took advantage of the con-
versations to express his own previous sexual experiences."
Furthermore, she alleged that he intimidated his students from com-
plaining about him, and "repeatedly made fun of students who had
expressed offense or disgust and he also laughed at them."33
The Dean of Arts and Science, Gus J. Demas, scheduled a meeting
with Bonnell and gave him a copy of the student's complaint. Bonnell,
after redacting the student's name, made copies of the complaint and
handed them out in all his classes and posted them on his bulletin board.
At an investigative meeting on December 3, 1998, MacQueen warned
Bonnell about disseminating the complaint in violation of the College's
policy that student complaints are confidential. Bonnell responded by
distributing more than 200 copies of the complaint to faculty members,
attaching to each an eight-page satirical response entitled: An Apology:
Yes, Virginia, There is a Sanity Clause (Apology).
Yet another meeting was held, on December 18, 1998, after which the
Dean of Arts and Science issued a memorandum to Bonnell reciting that
he had "used vulgar and obscene language without reference to assigned
readings,"34 giving specific examples. It referred to earlier notices, both
32. Id. at 804.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 805.
[Vol. 32, No. 4
Academic Freedom and the Obligation to Earn It 455
to the faculty in general and to Bonnell in particular, that discipline
would be imposed for gratuitous and regular use of vulgar or obscene
language not "germane to course content (and thus educational purpose)
as measured by professional standards."35 The Dean's memorandum con-
cluded by informing Bonnell that he was suspended for three days with-
out pay, commencing February 1, 1999 and ending February 3, 1999.
Several days later, after learning of Bonnell's dissemination of the
complaint and other materials such as the Apology, MacQueen sent
another memorandum to Bonnell, stating that Bonnell's posting and dis-
tribution "conveys the message that complaining students may be
expected to be ridiculed by [him] and ostracized by their classmates, and
thus may be deterred from complaining."36 It directed him not to post,
distribute "or discuss verbally or in writing"37 specific complaints with-
out written permission from "Dr. Rose Bellanca [the Provost] upon
application of [his] union or attorney."38
Bonnell next sent a redacted copy of the student complaint and his
Apology to the local media and told his students of his suspension.
Nearly all of the students in his five classes declined to attend the class-
es of a substitute teacher and pre-signed attendance sheets indicating
that they supported him and were protesting his suspension. The College
then informed Bonnell that he was suspended, with pay and benefits,
pending an investigation. He sued the university and its agents39 who had
taken action against him.40
The district court initially denied Bonnell's motion for a preliminary
injunction and remanded the matter to the College for an administrative
hearing. MacQueen presided over a May 25, 1999 hearing and, roughly
two weeks later, issued a memorandum finding
reasonable cause to believe that [Bonnell] ... violated Federal and
Michigan law, College policies and directives, and the collective
bargaining agreement between [the faculty union] and the College.
In addition, there is reasonable cause to believe that [Bonnell] con-
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Bonnell subsequently amended his complaint to include pendent state law claims against
the College's Board of Trustees for breach of contract.
40. Bonnell also sued the College's faculty union representative for failing to act on his
behalf.
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tributed improperly to the disruption of the educational process in
[his] classes. 4'
The memorandum charged Bonnell with: "1) insubordination; 2) breach
of confidentiality; 3) retaliation; and 4) disruption of the educational
process. 42 It informed Bonnell that he was entitled to a hearing, which
Bonnell subsequently declined.
Approximately a month later, Provost Bellanca issued a memorandum
concluding that Bonnell: [1] disrupted the educational process; [2] was
insubordinate; [3] breached confidentiality; and [4] retaliated against the
complaining student. The memorandum suspended Bonnell without pay
for fourteen days for disruption and insubordination. In addition, refer-
ring to a "Guidance" published by the Office of Civil Rights within the
United States Department of Education, the memorandum noted the
College's obligation to take "strong responsive action" in the event of
retaliation. It referred to case law supportive of "actions as severe as ter-
mination as being appropriate for breach of confidentiality."
Nevertheless, "in deference" to Bonnell's length of service, "and in the
belief that rehabilitation is still possible," his suspension for breach of
confidentiality and retaliation was limited to four months without pay. In
anticipation of his return to work, the College told him that his fringe
benefits were to remain in place during the suspension.
Bonnell went back to the district court, which, unfortunately, granted
a preliminary injunction against the College and ordered Bonnell rein-
stated. Bonnell returned to work and, to the surprise of no experienced
university administrator, almost immediately generated another formal
student complaint, this one alleging profanity and offensive language,
denigration of the Jewish faith and denigration of women. The complaint
suggested that if the College continued to employ "this perverted man,"
it should attach warning labels on the announcement of his course indi-
cating "extremely explicit language and sexual content."43 Mercifully for
all of us, the College appealed the preliminary injunction.
B. The Reversal of The Injunction; Some Basic Rules
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit quashed the preliminary
injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with
41. Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 807.
42. Id. at 807.
43. Id. at 808.
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its opinion. The basic point was that the preliminary injunction was inap-
propriate because Bonnell failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood
that he would succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim. The
court gave two reasons why Bonnell was unlikely to succeed.
The first reason, which the court only addressed briefly, was the
defendants' qualified immunity. "It is well-established that the defense
of qualified immunity grants government officials engaged in discre-
tionary activities immunity from individual liability for civil damages
unless their conduct violates 'clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"' No
court decisions clearly established that Bonnell's speech was constitu-
tionally protected. The defendants were immune because they would not
have understood that their actions violated Bonnell's rights.
The second reason for quashing the injunction, discussed at much
greater length, is that Bonnell was not likely to succeed on the merits of
his claim that his First Amendment rights had been violated. The court
said that, as a public employee, in order to establish a claim that the
defendants violated his First Amendment right to free speech, Bonnell
had "to demonstrate that 1) he was disciplined for speech that was
directed toward an issue of public concern, and 2) that his interest in
speaking as he did outweighed the College's interest in regulating his
speech."45 Although the court agreed that some of Bonnell's speech "was
protected as addressing a matter of public concern," it said that it was an
error to conclude that Bonnell's speech interests "outweighed the
College's interests in [1] prohibiting retaliation against students who file
sexual harassment complaints, [2] maintaining the confidentiality of its
students, [3] maintaining a disruption-free environment, and [4] main-
taining its federal funding."46
C. The Mixed Speech
The court examined "the acts of expression for which [Bonnell] was
disciplined," namely, his distribution of the Apology with the student's
sexual harassment complaint to his students, fellow faculty members,
and the media, and his use of classroom language "considered to be
44. Id. at 824 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
45. Id. at 809. On the other hand, if the "speech does not involve a matter of public concern,
it is unnecessary for the court to scrutinize the reason for the discipline." Id. at 810.
46. Id. at 811. The court found error even though it said that the inquiry into whether Bonnell's
interests in speaking outweighed the College's interests was a fact determination. Id. at 810.
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obscene and not germane to the course content."47 It found that only "a
portion" of his speech "addresses a matter of public concern." Bonnell
was "a mixed speech case," "perhaps the most difficult subset of
employee speech cases to litigate," because the "speech at issue concerns
both private as well as public matters."48
1. The Complaint
One act of expression for which Bonnell was disciplined was his dis-
tribution of the sexual harassment complaint lodged against him. The
court acknowledged that, in the usual case involving a sexual harassment
complaint, it is the party complaining of sexual harassment who alleges
a First Amendment violation in retaliation for filing the complaint.
Nevertheless, even though it was the alleged sexual harasser who was
claiming a free speech right, the complaint "related to sexual harassment
and therefore involves a matter of public import."49 It did not matter that
Bonnell "may have circulated the Complaint in the context of a heated
dispute with the College and out of personal animus in retaliation against
the complaining student."5 The act of expression "was protected under
the First Amendment."5'
2. The Apology
The court said that Bonnell's Apology, "although expressed as a satiri-
cal diatribe fraught with references to [Bonnell's] personal disagreement
with the student's characterization [of] and reaction to his classroom lan-
guage-addressed a matter of public concern."52 It did not matter that the
title was in response to the remedy requested by the complaining student
or that the document was retaliatory53 or criticized the complaint and the
College's response to it. Although the complaint appeared to be "a per-
sonal attack on the various parties involved, the content also addresses the
47. Id. at 811. Judges Clay and Cole disagreed with concurring Judge Nelson, who said that,
in the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court on mixed speech cases, the appropriate
course of analysis is to assume that all the speech is protected speech. See id. at 811 n.7.
48. Id. at 812.
49. Id. at 813.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 815.
53. The court comments:
Based upon the nature of the Apology, one could conclude that Plaintiff was motivated
by personal animus against the complaining student as well as against the College for
its reaction to her Complaint, and that he circulated the Apology as a retaliatory gesture
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College's sexual harassment policy as it relates to classroom language. 5 4
Furthermore, in the Apology, Bonnell "was speaking as a concerned citi-
zen about the importance of the right to free speech under the First
Amendment, and the need to protect that right in society."5
3. Classroom Language
The content of Bonnell's classroom language that was at issue is what
the College referred to as profanity not "germane to course content."
Reviewing the March 4, 1998 memorandum to Bonnell, relating the
"unless germane" standard to the College's concern that Bonnell was
"fostering a learning environment hostile to women, a form of sexual
harassment," the court concluded that the College was not concerned
with the content of Bonnell's speech but rather with its context and form:
[I]t was not the content of [Bonnell's] speech itself which led to the
disciplinary action; rather, it was the context and form in which
[Bonnell] used the speech-i.e., in the course of his teaching where
the language was not germane to the course content-that the College
found to be in violation of its sexual harassment policy.6
The court noted that a recent United States Supreme Court decision
opined that "[t]he protection afforded to offensive messages does not
always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling
audience cannot avoid it. Indeed, it may not be the content of the speech,
as much as the deliberate verbal or visual assault, that justifies proscrip-
tion."57 After reviewing another profane professor case and a case in
which a basketball coach used the term "nigger" to "motivate" his stu-
dents, the court concluded:
[Jiust as a university coach may have the constitutional right to use
the word "nigger," but does not have the constitutional right to use
the word in the context of motivating his basketball players, so too,
against these parties.... However, even assuming that [Bonnell] was motivated by per-
sonal animus ... the fact remains that in doing so, he addressed a matter occurring at
the college which was of public concern.
Id. at 817.
54. Id. at 815.
55. Id. at 816.
56. Id. at 819.
57. Id. at 819 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000)).
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[Bonnell] may have a constitutional right to use words such as
"pussy," "cunt," and "fuck," but he does not have a constitutional
right to use them in a classroom setting where they are not germane
to the subject matter, in contravention of the College's sexual
harassment policy. This is particularly so when one considers the
unique context in which the speech is conveyed-a classroom where
a college professor is speaking to a captive audience of students who
cannot "effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities
simply by averting their ears."58
The court quoted with approval language from the basketball coach case
indicating that an "instructor's choice of teaching methods does not rise
to the level of protected expression."59
D. Balancing the Interests
1. The Interests of the College
The Sixth Circuit said that the lower court failed to balance the speech
interests of Bonnell against the College's interests in its policy: 1) to dis-
cipline Bonnell for conduct that threatened the College's eligibility to
receive federal funding under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act,6° which forbids the release of educational records and personally
identifiable information without prior written authorization; 2) to pro-
hibit retaliation against students who file sexual harassment complaints,
as expressly prohibited by the College's sexual harassment policy;61 3) to
maintain the confidentiality of a student complaint as provided by the
collective bargaining agreement between the College and Bonnell's
union; and 4) to maintain a learning environment free of faculty disrup-
tion. Each of these interests is significant in promoting "efficiency and
integrity" in the discharge of the College's official duties.
2. Bonnell's Academic Freedom
Bonnell claimed that his interests in free speech under the First
Amendment and his interest in academic freedom outweighed the
58. Id. at 820 (citations omitted).
59. Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190-91 (6th Cir. 1995).
60. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2003).
61. The court said that the issues are the same whether the sexual harassment complaint is
brought under Title IX or pursuant to an internal sexual harassment policy.
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College's interests. On the issue of academic freedom, which the court
said is not "an independent First Amendment right," the court sounded
very much like the court in Urofsky. The court emphasized that a univer-
sity has academic freedom rights that are inconsistent with the freedom of
individual faculty. "[T]he Supreme Court has .. .recognized that 'aca-
demic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited
exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat
inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself."'62
The Sixth Circuit reiterated Justice Felix Frankfurter's famous reference
to "the four essential freedoms of a university-to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study."63 It quoted one of its own
opinions that the term academic freedom "is used to denote both the
freedom of the academy to pursue its end without interference from the
government ... and the freedom of the individual teacher... to pursue
his ends without interference from the academy; and these two freedoms
are in conflict."' Although the College "was not claiming an interest in
academic freedom per se," the "autonomous decisionmaking" of the
College must be weighed in the balance.
3. Balancing the Interests
With relatively little discussion, the court concluded that the College's
interests, "including maintaining the confidentiality of student sexual
harassment complaints, disciplining teachers who retaliate against stu-
dents who file sexual harassment claims, and creating an atmosphere
free of faculty disruption,"65 outweighed Bonnell's "claimed free speech
and academic freedom interests."66 Most of the court's discussion
focused on the issue of harassment:
[C]olleges and universities are legally required to maintain a hostile-
free learning environment and must strive to create policies which
serve that purpose. While a professor's rights to academic freedom
62. Bonnell, 241 F.3d at 823 (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226
n.12 (1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis added)).
63. Id. at 823 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (emphasis
added)).
64. Id. at 823 (citing Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 826 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added)).
65. Id. at 823.
66. Id. at 824.
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and freedom of expression are paramount in the academic setting,
they are not absolute to the point of compromising a student's right
to learn in a hostile-free environment. To hold otherwise under these
circumstances would send a message that the First Amendment may
be used as a shield by teachers who choose to use their unique and
superior position to sexually harass students secure in the knowledge
that whatever they say or do will be protected. Such a result is one
that a state college or university is legally obligated to prevent, and
such a result would fail to consider the countervailing interests.67
A learning institution has "a strong interest in preventing" speech "that
rises to the level of harassment-whether based on sex, race, ethnicity, or
other invidious premise-and which creates a hostile learning environ-
ment that ultimately thwarts the academic process."6
IV. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS, SOCIAL CONTRACTS
AND SEEKING THE TRUTH
A. Urofsky, Bonnell and the First Amendment
Urofsky and Bonnell appear to take different approaches but reach the
same result. The Urofsky court might have said that Bonnell's speech
was not protected because it was spoken in his capacity as an employee
rather than in his capacity as a citizen. Instead, Bonnell said that much
of Bonnell's speech was entitled to some First Amendment protection
because it was directed toward an issue of public concern, but was sanc-
tionable nonetheless because of the greater interests of the university. A
concurring opinion in Bonnell expressed discomfort with stating that
Bonnell was expressing himself "as a citizen" on "matters of public con-
67. Id. at 823-24.
68. Id. at 824.
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cern,"69 but noted that the outcome of the balancing approach was the
same.
70
The suggestion in both Urofsky and Bonnell that academic freedom
rights exist in the university as an entity rather than in individual faculty
is contrary to the AAUP's articulation of the American tradition of aca-
demic freedom. It is, however, consistent with significant judicial and
scholarly opinion. In 1989, Professor Peter Byrne stated that, rather than
protect the professional autonomy of individual faculty, "constitutional
academic freedom should primarily insulate the university in core aca-
demic matters from interference by the state. 71 In Professor Byrne's
view: "When presented with claims by faculty members that other aca-
demics, usually administrators and department chairs, have violated their
rights to academic freedom, courts should only ascertain if the adminis-
trators can establish that they have in good faith rejected the candidate on
academic grounds."72
These two cases, and scholarly commentary such as Professor
Byrne's, provide welcome support for academic administrators who
seek to hold aberrant professors accountable. We need not cower when-
ever deviant faculty assert their First Amendment "rights." Our hesitan-
cy to police deviant and substandard classroom and other workplace
69. In a concurring opinion, Judge Nelson comments:
I am somewhat ambivalent... about our holding that the acts of insubordination com-
mitted by Professor Bonnell in publicizing his student's sexual harassment complaint-a
breach of confidentiality against which he had repeatedly been warned-like his
promiscuous broadcasting of the screed in which he sought to justify both the class-
room recitals of his own sexual escapades and the apparently gratuitous use of coarse
language in the classroom, rose to the level of speech in which the professor was
expressing himself "as a citizen" on "matters of public concern."
Id. at 827 (Nelson, concurring).
70. Judge Nelson continues:
If our disposition of the appeal had necessarily turned on our answer to the question
whether Professor Bonnell was speaking "as a citizen" upon matters of public concern,
I should probably have swallowed hard-thinking uncharitable thoughts about the
nature of the assignment given us-and answer in the affirmative. As it happens, how-
ever, the outcome of the appeal would be no different if we answered the question oth-
erwise-if we held, i.e., that Professor Bonnell was speaking "as an employee" upon
matters only of personal interest. Either way, given the inevitable result of our balanc-
ing of the parties' respective interests ... the order granting a preliminary injunction
would have to be reversed.
Id. at 828 (Nelson, concurring).
71. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99
YALE L.J. 252, 255 (1989).
72. Id. at 308.
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behavior has damaged our academic environments and cost us signifi-
cantly in public good will. The recent controversy over the University of
Kansas's Human Sexuality course is another illustration of a very public
controversy that hurts us all.
B. Improper Reliance on Third-Party Sources of Academic
Freedom
Urofsky and Bonnell suggest two principal third party sources for aca-
demic freedom: the federal courts, applying the First Amendment; and
market forces.
The extent to which there is a special First Amendment right to aca-
demic freedom is a matter of continuing controversy. The range of judi-
cial opinion on the issue is likely to exceed the divergent views in
Urofsky and Bonnell. One of the top scholars on our faculty has a man-
uscript under way advocating a First Amendment-based right to aca-
demic freedom. More conservative scholars would find a much more
limited role for the constitution in academic administration and gover-
nance. Time will tell.
Nor is it clear how much protection for academic freedom can be
expected to come from market forces. I believe, although I have no
empirical basis for it, that Bonnell is correct that market forces tend to
preserve a significant amount of academic freedom, at least at many insti-
tutions. The reputational effects of a significant move away from aca-
demic freedom could be very significant. There are markets for faculty,
markets for administrators, markets for students, markets for contributed
dollars and, especially in the context of graduate research universities,
markets for contract and grant funding. A university, its governing boards
and funding sources, are, to varying extents, subject to the external con-
straints of those markets. So, too, again to varying extents, are the people
who appoint governing boards. On the other hand, external forces can
also pull counter to academic freedom.
Those of us within the academy should not rely on the First
Amendment or on market forces to protect academic freedom. We
should be much more proactive.
C. Social Contract and Shared Culture
I believe it is most useful for us to consider academic freedom as coming
about as a matter of a social contract. The long-term contractual relation-
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ship is defined and evolves as a result of experience, culture and expecta-
tions. When academic freedom is viewed as a matter of social contract, we
in the academy are faced directly with the question of what we should be
doing to continue to earn academic freedom. What are the key provisions
we must perform in our long-term contractual relationship with society?
My thesis is that our core mission is to seek truth. Historically, aca-
demic freedom has been permitted because universities and their facul-
ties have been perceived and valued as seekers, teachers and publishers
of truth. We have special respect, special deference, and are valued in
various markets, because we are perceived as seekers of truth. If we want
to advance the cause of academic freedom, we have to protect and
advance the cause of truth-seeking on campus.
We need to insist, among ourselves and for others to perceive, that
important truths are being sought and told by competent and productive
professionals. This means we need to consider both individual and institu-
tional accountability. We must put our own house in order. We should take
measures that are within our grasp to define and protect academic freedom
as a matter of social contract, institutional culture and faculty contract.
We also need to make sure that, with respect to academic freedom, we
have important common understandings with our key external constituen-
cies. It ought to be a matter of great concern if our key external con-
stituencies perceive us very differently than we perceive ourselves. It
ought to be cause for great concern if issues that are critical to us are unfa-
miliar or alien to them.
A recent survey of public opinion published by The Chronicle of Higher
Education (Chronicle) suggested that there is a great disparity between on-
campus and off-campus views of academic freedom and tenure. "Slightly
more than half of respondents agree that tenure protects academic free-
dom, but far fewer agree that experienced college professors should be
granted a job for life as long as they commit no serious misconduct."73
While many within the academy would quarrel with the way the ques-
tion in the survey was phrased, the divergence is clear. More important-
ly, the divergence was the greatest among those people who are likely to
serve on boards of trustees. "Only 25% of respondents with annual
incomes over $100,000 support tenure, compared with 50% of those
with incomes under $25,000." 7"
73. What Americans Think About Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 2, 2003,
at A14.
74. Id.
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Let me offer an analogy that points the way for what I see as the task
ahead. With our fund-raising hats on, we talk of establishing and nurtur-
ing a "culture of philanthropy" that is shared by students, faculty, alum-
ni and others. It is critical that we establish and nurture a culture of aca-
demic freedom-a sense that we are seekers of truth in ways that are
important to society. The core value of truth seeking is critical both to
academic freedom and to the culture of philanthropy. In short, it is crit-
ical to our future.
V. THINGS WE CAN DO
There are many things we can do to perform our side of the social con-
tract that grants us academic freedom. Most basically, we need to be
accountable both at the faculty and at the institutional levels.
A. Holding Faculty Accountable
We are probably best at holding untenured faculty individually account-
able. Even here, the experience varies greatly among institutions, and
within a particular unit seems to vary depending upon whether teaching or
research is the focus. Some schools or colleges that impose standards at or
close to their true aspirations do so out of fear of being reversed by uni-
versity promotion and tenure committees, provosts or presidents. For an
individual faculty member, department chair or dean, there can be far
more pain than gain in imposing high standards on colleagues, especially
given the prevalence of allegations of improper motive.
We have not done as good a job at holding tenured faculty account-
able. Nationwide, post-tenure review is being forced from the top down
because we in the academic units have failed to do it.75 Consider in par-
ticular the annual faculty contract. At many schools, a faculty member is
each year given an assignment of responsibilities that breaks down the
75. The AAUP has been staunchly opposed to post-tenure review. "The Association believes
that periodic formal institutional evaluation of each postprobationary faculty member would
bring scant benefit, would incur unacceptable costs, not only in money and time but also in damp-
ening of creativity and of collegial relationships, and would threaten academic freedom." Post-
Tenure Review: An AAUP Response, ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 1998 (reiterating the AAUP's "exist-
ing policy on post-tenure review, approved by Committee A and adopted by the Council in
November 1983"). This Report was approved by the Association's Committee on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, adopted by the Association's Council in June 1999 and endorsed that year
at the Association's Eighty-Fifth Annual Meeting. See generally www.aaup.org.
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year's contracted-for assignment into the three components of teaching,
scholarship and service. At our university, for example, it is common for
faculty to have from 25-35% of their assignment earmarked for research.
Yet too many faculty have produced too little research. In some cases, it
is not clear how the research advances institutional goals. University
funding sources now look at the faculty payrolls, compare them to the
faculty assignments of responsibility, come up with a dollar amount, and
ask what they are getting for the money.
The Chronicle public opinion survey reflects widespread public skep-
ticism about the research mission of faculty. Yet this is what we pride
ourselves in at many of our institutions. How do we account to funding
sources in ways that resonate with them? For example, what should we
ask of a school or college with forty full professors, with an average
salary of $100,000 per year and an average research assignment of 25%?
How much scholarship should those forty faculty generate for the
$1,000,000 they are being paid to do it? What should the nature of the
scholarship be? Can faculty simply write on anything they like or on
nothing at all? In many universities, faculty, department chairs and deans,
and even provosts and presidents, have been too timid to hold tenured
faculty accountable. We will lose some of the academic freedom we have
if we do not do a better job. We will suffer if we fail to honor our side of
the contract and the culture no longer supports what we value.
We also need to make sure that we maintain healthy academic com-
munities that nurture academic freedom among a diversity of scholars.
At least in law, scholars are often part of balkanized communities.
Harvard Law's Professor Mary Ann Glendon has described her faculty
as one that experienced a diminished regard for itself as a community of
seekers, teachers and tellers of truth.76 As discussed further below, many
faculties have become politically imbalanced.77 We need to value a diver-
sity of opinion and of scholarship. We need to make room for many voic-
es while avoiding becoming a Tower of Babel.
We need to protect the academic freedom of new faculty. We need to
be honest with ourselves and with them about the kind of scholarship that
is valued at our institution. One size does not fit all. Consider the exam-
ple of law schools. At some schools, faculty who are not economically-
oriented in their writing will not be valued. Some schools are refreshing-
ly honest about this. Others are less forthcoming. At some institutions,
76. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 206 (1994).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 80-85.
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personal narrative will be viewed with skepticism, either at the law school
or at the university level. A part of the academic freedom we owe to new
faculty is clarity and honesty about the parameters within which it oper-
ates. We must be more specific about our expectations for them as schol-
ars. If we are going to control what they write about and how they write
about it, if we are seeking to purchase a specific kind of scholarly good,
we ought to let them know when they are first offered a position."8
B. Institutional Accountability
We should also ask about institutional accountability for our academ-
ic freedom. Assuming that faculty will account for their assigned tasks,
what should those tasks be? Most broadly, if we are to be respected insti-
tutions of truth seeking and telling, we need to seek truths that are
important and that are valued by a significant element of our internal and
external constituencies. There is great room for different institutional
missions. Some schools can emphasize certain subject matters and oth-
ers can emphasize a distinctive educational process or philosophy. To
maximize our academic freedom, each of us should strive for tolerance
and balance within our own mission. At a minimum, we must acknowl-
edge and give proper respect to the truth seeking of others, both in the
classroom and in our scholarship.
At our law school, we believe that philosophical inquiry must be at the
heart of the educational experience. Philosophy is an organization of expe-
rience, experience with matters such as good and evil, right and wrong, the
just and the unjust. We believe that we should prepare our students to deal
with such weighty matters in their own lives, careers and communities by
exposing them to rigorous consideration of the great issues. Especially in
an era in which many undergraduates major in such subjects as hospitality
administration or real estate, universities also must make available to their
students the systematic exploration of the great philosophical and moral
questions. History and philosophy must have a place of great importance in
78. Another threat to academic freedom is presented by faculty who are pulling or sending
punches in their scholarship, or sending bouquets to curry academic, business or political favor.
Faculty develop scholarly product lines for external markets. A faculty member who develops a
specialty advocating for fiduciary duties may be less valuable as an expert witness after convert-
ing to contractarianism. Addressing "the effect of money and worldly ambition on scholarly writ-
ing and research," former Harvard University President Derek Bok wrote that "it is quite possi-
ble that the resulting dangers pose a greater risk to scholarship than any threats arising from con-
ventional attacks on academic freedom." BOK, supra note 8, at 25.
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our curriculum. So should the exploration of solutions to pressing contem-
porary problems. Interestingly, the Chronicle survey reported an extremely
strong public sentiment for a broad-based undergraduate education.79
How are we going to make available to our students everything from
core doctrine, to philosophy and ethics, to close investigation of solu-
tions to social problems? We cannot all do all things. Most of us have
limited resources and will need to define a core mission. We will decide
to do some things rather than others. On the other hand, many of us have
not fully deployed all the resources at our disposal. For example, law
schools that are part of larger universities often remain remarkably iso-
lated from the rest of campus. One way to teach more philosophy, eco-
nomics or social welfare to law students is to collaborate with other units
on campus. We need to make the teachings of particular faculties avail-
able to our students, and we need to use those individual faculty as a
bridge between faculties. We can also use teleconferencing technology
to bring people from other campuses, or from off-campus, to our stu-
dents and colleagues in a cost-effective way.
C. The Sensitive Issue of Political Balance
An extremely sensitive aspect of institutional neutrality is hiring to
correct or to avoid social or political imbalance of the faculty or admin-
istration. Some academics are shocked at the very suggestion that polit-
ical or social imbalance should be taken into account in decisions. Merit,
they would say, should in all cases control. On the other hand, merit is
often in the eye of the beholder and universities, just like other organi-
zations, can become inappropriately "clubby" to their own detriment.
For example, most academics embrace the notion that university facul-
ties should include more women and minorities. Most of them probably
also embrace the notion that the requisite diversity will not be achieved
in a timely way without institutional commitment and follow-through.
Similar concerns exist with respect to philosophical and political diver-
sity. Some academic institutions are perceived as having gotten too
"clubby" on the right whereas others are perceived as having gotten too
"clubby" on the left. The perception, of course, is often very much in the
eye of the beholder. Although it is vital that we have colleges and uni-
79. "[Allmost three in five Americans think it is very important for colleges to offer a broad-
based general education to undergraduates...." What Americans Think About Higher Education,
supra note 73.
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versities of diverse missions and philosophies, particular institutions,
and particular classes of institutions, can weaken themselves if they
cease to be balanced seekers and tellers of truth.
First, the richness of debate, in the classrooms, in the halls, in faculty
offices and in scholarship, will suffer if an academic institution is captured
by one ideology. Second, an academic institution or a class of academic
institutions, that has become captive of a particular orthodoxy is likely to
lose the support of those who do not share it. Public institutions can be
particularly vulnerable in this regard. There is considerable sentiment that
many academic institutions, particularly many public institutions, are tilt-
ed politically to the left. Although there has been a great deal of writing
on "political correctness" on campuses, much of it is anecdotal, with lit-
tle empirical support.
This spring, an article entitled Conservatives Need Not Apply appeared
in The Wall Street Journal" reporting a study of 1994-2000 federal cam-
paign contributions over $200 by law faculty at the top twenty-two law
schools. The study reported that, although Americans are divided rough-
ly evenly between Democrats and Republicans, 74% of all professors
contribute primarily to Democrats with only 16% to Republicans.8' The
authors assert that these overall percentages actually "substantially
understate the effect of the partisan imbalance at most schools. 82
Republican-contributing law professors are very disproportionately
concentrated at two schools-the University of Virginia and
Northwestern. In contrast, many other elite schools have few or no
politically active Republicans. At Yale, where almost 50% of the
faculty donate, almost 95% give predominantly to Democrats. At
Michigan itself the ratio is eight to one. Sometimes the amounts
donated can be instructive: in the last six years Georgetown law pro-
fessors have donated approximately $180,000 to the Democratic
Party, $2,000 to the GOP and $1,500 to the Green party.83
The conclusion of the study was that mainstream conservative ideas are
no more represented "than those of the leftist fringe."84 The study also
80. John 0. McGinnis & Matthew Schwartz, Conservatives Need Not Apply, WALL ST. J.,
April 1, 2003, at A14.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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concludes that the debate is even more one-sided in the case of issues of
public concern:
[P]rofessors teaching economics-based subjects like antitrust and
corporations are more conservative than their public-law counter-
parts. This leaves such subjects as constitutional law and interna-
tional law-the subjects that set the agenda for debate on the hot-but-
ton issues of our time-with scarcely a conservative voice.85
Other popular media, such as U.S. News & World Report, have carried
similar reports.86 The Chronicle's recent survey of public opinion affirms
that a majority of Americans view college professors as more liberal
than themselves. There is considerable sentiment that the one-sidedness
of the faculty is harming the student experience. "'Some colleges are so
one-sided politically that students really don't have an opportunity to
hear the other side, and that weakens their education,' says Jerry Martin,
president of the American Council of Trustees and Alumni, a group that
has opposed what it sees as political correctness on campus."87 U.S.
News's John Leo concludes that "politicians, civic leaders, and alumni
have to start browbeating universities into making facilities more open
and diverse."88
Some university leaders have begun to take steps in response to over-
ly ideological campuses. Often these steps are being taken quietly.
Harvard's new President Lawrence Summers is an exception, undertak-
ing bold corrections to what he sees as the lopsidedness and intolerance
of campus culture.89 For example, "[w]hile much of the university world
took the view that the United States must in some important way have
85. Id.
86. John Leo, The Absent Professor, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 23, 2002, at 14.
In eight academic departments surveyed at Cornell University, 166 professors were reg-
istered in the Democratic Party or another party on the left, with just six registered with
Republicans or another party of the right. Similar imbalance showed up in departments
at the 19 other universities surveyed. At the University of Colorado-Boulder, the num-
bers were 116 to 5. It was 151-17 at Stanford, 54-3 at Brown, 99-6 at the University of
California-San Diego, and 59-7 at Berkeley, the flagship of the University of California
system. At Williams College, a poll turned up only four registered Republicans among
the more than 200 professors on campus.
Id.
87. What Americans Think About Higher Education, supra note 73.
88. Leo, supra note 86.
89. See James Traub, Harvard Radical, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 28.
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been responsible for the [September 11] attacks, Summers says that he
felt called to speak up for patriotic values."9 He "seemed to be lecturing
his own university and kindred institutions in public."9' For further
example, "he demanded the reversal of a policy that had prevented stu-
dents from listing R.O.T.C. service in the yearbook and made a point of
addressing the R.O.T.C. graduation ceremony at the end of the year."912
The broader point is that presidents, provosts, deans, department chairs,
and even individual faculty, can help to correct existing imbalances by
jawboning and by making other subtle changes to increase intellectual
tolerance and philosophical diversity on campus.
When if ever is it appropriate to tailor faculty hiring to end existing
imbalances? It is accepted canon throughout the academy that racial and
ethnic diversity is an important value. What about political diversity?
Philosophical diversity? Is it ever appropriate to hire to correct greater
political imbalance that is skewing campus dialog? Is it appropriate to
hire to correct political or philosophical balance if virtually all of your
faculty are of one political party or of one philosophy? Is it appropriate
to do indirectly what can not or should not be done directly? For exam-
ple, it is appropriate to change the emphasis within an organization by
hiring people in subject matters that have an orientation that will, in the
aggregate, tend to enhance the balance you seek? Summers' predecessor
Bok suggested great caution but indicated some sympathy for a subject
matter approach.93
90. Id. at 33.
91. Id. at 33.
92. Id. at 33.
93. BOK, supra note 8, at 28.
To be sure, an institution may wish to provide opportunities to study a variety of major
fields of thought and experience, and this effort may indirectly affect the ideologies
represented within its faculty. For example, a decision to offer instruction in socialist
economics will increase the chances of appointing a socialist to the extent that social-
ists are more likely to specialize in this subject. Even so, the underlying decision by the
university involves a choice of field and not a determination to appoint a professor of
any particular ideological persuation.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As the law now stands, faculty have no special First Amendment right
to academic freedom. Faculty are university employees who function
within the terms of their contracts and campus culture. Both contract and
culture have given faculty great latitude in defining their own work, par-
ticularly their research. We have been given this freedom because we
have been perceived to be seekers, teachers and writers of truth.
The task for universities and their faculties is to continue to earn this
special place. There should be increased accountability at both the level
of individual faculty and at the institutional level. At the extreme, deviant
behavior of the sort described in Bonnell should not be tolerated. Sexual
harassment and other abusive faculty behavior should not be permitted
to hide under the mantle of academic freedom. More broadly, universi-
ties and their faculty should pursue in balanced ways missions of truth-
seeking that enrich campus debate on fundamental issues of importance
to their key constituencies.
If a faculty within a particular school, college or university does not
seek a meaningful mission of truth-seeking, and a balanced approach to
that mission, the dean, university administration or external funding
source may take action. The faculty may lose its freedom to define the
institution. The dean might raise professorships or chairs to provide
incentives to attract or retain specific types of faculty. Provosts, presi-
dents or external funding sources may, with or without the encourage-
ment of the dean, provide new monies, or renew old monies, only on the
condition that they be spent for particular purposes.
If university administrations or external funding sources feel that redi-
recting a unit is inefficient or unpleasant, they may simply deploy
resources elsewhere. The worst case scenario for higher education-
especially in the public sector-is that funding sources turn their backs
on us and cause us to wither away, not with a bang, but with a budget-
ary whimper.
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